Ресурси на български език
Бакалова, М. Знаем ли нещо за външния свят? (2012)

bakalova_m._znaem_li_neshto_za_wynshniq_swqt.pdf | |
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Вълчев, Х. За
познавателната стойност на постулирането на ненаблюдаеми обекти (2013)

valtchev_h._unobservables.pdf | |
File Size: | 306 kb |
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Ресурси на английски език
Churchland, P. S. Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy 84, (10) 544-553. [URL]
Churchland, P. S. (2004) How do neurons know?. Daedalus. On Learning , (Winter) 42-50. [URL]
Goldman, A. (1967) A Causal Theory of Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 64: 357-372. [URL]
Goldman, A. Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 1-26 (2007). Also printed in Christian Beyer and Alex Burri, eds., Philosophical Knowledge, Its Possibility and Scope. Amsterdam: Rodopi (2007) [URL]
Goldman, A. (1992) Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology. In: Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, MIT Press, pp. 155-175. [URL]
Goldman, A. (1979) What is Justified Belief? In: George Pappas, ed. Justification and Knowledge. D. Reidel, pp. 1-23. [URL]
Milikan, R. How We Make Our Ideas Clear: Empiricist Epistemology for Empirical Concepts. The Tenth Annual Romannell Lecture on Philosophical Naturalism For the American Philosophical Association [URL]
Moore, G. E. (1925). A defense of common sense. (especially Part IV, pp 127-133). In J. H. Muirhead (ed), Contemporary British Philosophy, second series. London: George Allen & Unwin, 192-233. Reprinted in Thomas Baldwin (ed): G. E. Moore Selected Writings (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 106-133. [URL]
Russell, B. (1911). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910-1911. Reprinted in his Mysticism and Logic. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1917. Reprinted 1951 Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books. Pages 152-167. [URL]
Ryle, G. Knowing How and Know That. (an extract from The Concept of Mind) [URL]
Sellars, W. (1981). Naturalism and process. The Monist, 64: 37-65. [URL]
Quine, W. V. O. (1948) On What There Is. Review of Metaphysics. Reprinted in 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard. University Press. [URL]
Churchland, P. S. (2004) How do neurons know?. Daedalus. On Learning , (Winter) 42-50. [URL]
Goldman, A. (1967) A Causal Theory of Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 64: 357-372. [URL]
Goldman, A. Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 1-26 (2007). Also printed in Christian Beyer and Alex Burri, eds., Philosophical Knowledge, Its Possibility and Scope. Amsterdam: Rodopi (2007) [URL]
Goldman, A. (1992) Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology. In: Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, MIT Press, pp. 155-175. [URL]
Goldman, A. (1979) What is Justified Belief? In: George Pappas, ed. Justification and Knowledge. D. Reidel, pp. 1-23. [URL]
Milikan, R. How We Make Our Ideas Clear: Empiricist Epistemology for Empirical Concepts. The Tenth Annual Romannell Lecture on Philosophical Naturalism For the American Philosophical Association [URL]
Moore, G. E. (1925). A defense of common sense. (especially Part IV, pp 127-133). In J. H. Muirhead (ed), Contemporary British Philosophy, second series. London: George Allen & Unwin, 192-233. Reprinted in Thomas Baldwin (ed): G. E. Moore Selected Writings (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 106-133. [URL]
Russell, B. (1911). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910-1911. Reprinted in his Mysticism and Logic. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1917. Reprinted 1951 Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books. Pages 152-167. [URL]
Ryle, G. Knowing How and Know That. (an extract from The Concept of Mind) [URL]
Sellars, W. (1981). Naturalism and process. The Monist, 64: 37-65. [URL]
Quine, W. V. O. (1948) On What There Is. Review of Metaphysics. Reprinted in 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard. University Press. [URL]